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Abstract 
Biometric-based access control systems (BACSs) are vulnerable to replay attacks.  Replay attacks occur when a 
biometric template is intercepted and maliciously used to gain unauthorized access to a system. In this paper, we 
introduce a Genetic and Evolutionary Biometric Security (GEBS) application which uses a Genetic and Evolutionary 
Computation to develop disposable Feature Extractors (FEs) in an effort to mitigate replay attacks. We describe how 
a previously developed system known as GEFE (Genetic and Evolutionary Feature Extraction) can be used to evolve 
unique and disposable FEs for users of BACS. Furthermore, we propose two access control protocols based on the 
use of disposable FEs and/or their resulting templates (also referred to as feature vectors (FVs)). In our proposed 
protocols, FEs/FVs are used to authenticate the identity of individuals and are then discarded.  Our results show that 
this GEBS application can be successfully used to mitigate biometric replay attacks. 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection  
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1. Introduction 
Identification systems are vital, whether it be for large companies with thousands of employees, a
laboratory of hundreds, or a government meeting room that gives access to ten individuals [1,2]. Three 
common techniques for identification are knowledge-based, token-based, and biometric-based [3,4]. 
Token-based identification systems use some form of token, such as a driver’s license, or an ID card [4,5]. 
This form of identification could be considered the most vulnerable to improper use, due to the fact that 
tokens can be lost or stolen [6,7]. Knowledge-based identification systems have a slight advantage from a 
security standpoint, in that identification is based on what a user knows, such as a pin number or a 
password [8,9]. A password cannot be easily stolen but if a user writes it down, or if the user is seen 
entering it in, then it can be taken and used maliciously [10,11]. A biometric-based identification system,
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or biometric-based access control system (BACS), has an advantage over the two previously mentioned 
systems in that biometric modalities are difficult to replicate and are unique to individuals [11,12]. 
Though all of the previously mentioned systems have an advantage and can be combined in an effort to 
strengthen security, each of these systems are vulnerable to replay attacks [13].  
A replay attack occurs when information is captured during a legitimate authentication session and re-
sent (replayed) in an effort to gain illegal access [14,15]. This paper proposes the use of Genetic & 
Evolutionary Biometric Security (GEBS) in an effort to mitigate such attacks on BACS. 
In a typical BACS, a number of users enroll their biometric templates into a system. To create these 
templates, some feature extraction technique is used on the biometrics images of users. The technique then 
produces a template for each image. When a user wants to gain access to a system, a sensor reads in their 
biometrics and templates are created using the same feature extraction technique in the enrollment phase.
User’s templates are compared to their previously enrolled templates. If similarity scores (based on a 
distance metric) of the user’s enrolled template and recently created template are below a pre-specified 
decision threshold, then users will be given access. A replay attack could occur while the template is being 
transmitted across a network, in which case it is captured and re-submitted at a later time in an effort to 
gain unauthorized access.  
As a countermeasure to biometric replay attacks, a method known as GEFEML (Genetic and 
Evolutionary Feature Extraction-Machine Learning) can be used to create disposable Feature Extractors 
(FEs). GEFEML uses Genetic & Evolutionary Computations (GECs) [16] to evolve FEs that are distinct 
yet high performing.
GECs discover optimal or near optimal solutions to problems as follows. Initially, a population of 
randomly generated candidate solutions (CSs) is created. Each CS is then evaluated and assigned a fitness 
based on a user-specified evaluation function, which is used to determine its relative ‘goodness’. Next, 
parents are chosen from the population based on their fitness and are allowed to create offspring CSs. The 
offspring are each assigned a fitness and typically replace weaker members of the previous population. 
This evolutionary process of selecting parents, allowing them to procreate, and replacing weaker members 
of the population with the newly formed offspring is repeated until a user-specified stopping condition is 
reached, such as a user-defined number of evaluations occurring or the algorithm converges upon a
solution.   
During the training process of GEFEML, cross validation [17,18,19] is used in an effort to evolve FEs 
that generalize well to unseen subjects. The resulting FEs, as well as their associated FVs, are distinct and 
therefore can be used as disposable FEs/FVs.  
There are many different forms of defense against replay attacks. In [20], it is recommended to use 
encryption when passing verification data across a network. The disadvantage of encryption is that it is 
vulnerable to decryption methods. In [21], Hachez et al. suggests that the time be recorded as to when 
feature extraction occurs on the sensor level and when matching occurs. This method is prone to false 
time logging times, as well as communication errors [14].  
In [15], the concept of cancelable biometrics is introduced. This method uses a transform technique to 
distort the template at the sensor level. In the event that the transformed FV is captured, not only will the 
altered template protect the owner’s anonymity, but the system can switch to a new transform so that the 
captured template cannot be used to gain access. It is this concept of cancelable biometrics that is most 
similar to the proposed GEBS application.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 will present the background of GEFEML, Section 3
will present how we will apply GEFEML to evolve disposable FEs, Section 4 will present our experimental 
setup, in Section 5, we will present our results, and in Section 6, we will present our conclusions and 
future work. 
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2. Background 
In this section, we will provide a brief overview of the Local Binary Patterns method [22], which is 
used for FEs, an Estimation of Distribution algorithm [23], which GEFEML is an instance of, and 
GEFEML. This section will provide an overview of how GEFEML operates. GEFEML uses the Local Binary 
Pattern (LBP) method [22] to perform feature extraction, and an EDA is used to evolve the location of a 
set of patches on a set of images from which to extract features from. The fitness function within the 
evolutionary process for an FE is described. During the training process, cross-validation is performed on 
FEs to test the effectiveness of an FE on unseen subjects. The concepts introduced in this section will be 
referred to throughout the paper.   
2.1. Local Binary Patterns 
The LBP method extracts features represented as textural patterns from an image. The LBP method 
works as follows. An image is first segmented into rectangular regions (referred to as patches). 
Traditionally, the partitioned regions are of uniform size, cover the entire image, and are non-overlapping 
[24]. 
Next, features are extracted from each patch, where all interior pixels of a patch serve as center 
pixels. These center pixels are classified based on the pattern of intensity changes formed between the 
center pixel and its neighbors. The frequency count of the intensity patterns formed around the center 
pixels are captured in a histogram that represents the extracted features for that particular patch. More 
specifically, a center pixel, cp, is surrounded by t neighboring pixels that are a user-specified radius from 
cp. For this research, the size of the set of neighboring pixels, N = {n0, n1 … nt-1}, equals 8 and the radius 
equals one.   
The pixel classification process is as follows. The intensity value of cp is compared with the intensity 
values of each neighboring pixel in N to create an LBP value. The difference between a neighboring pixel 
and the center pixel is calculated and if the result is a negative value, then a zero bit is returned. Otherwise, 
a one bit will be returned.                       
For a given LBP value calculated for a cp, the corresponding binary bit string is defined as either 
uniform or non-uniform. A uniform pattern is a bit string that, when traversed circularly, contains two or 
fewer bit changes. A non-uniform pattern is a bit string that contains more than two bit changes. 
Distinguishing only uniform patterns is based on [22] which suggest that the most discriminating features 
of a facial image contain predominantly uniform patterns.  For a pixel neighborhood of size t, there will 
be (t-1) bit patterns with exactly two bit changes.  These bit patterns can be shifted circularly t times to 
create t(t-1) patterns with two bit changes.  There are also two patterns with no bit changes (all zeros and 
all ones), and we create a final category for all non-uniform bit patterns for a total of t(t-1) + 3 patterns 
As mentioned earlier, the LBP method calculates and represents the frequency count of each pattern 
using a histogram. Since this research uses a t value of 8, there are a total of 59 bins in each patch 
histogram. Ultimately, the histograms for all patches are concatenated to form the FV (feature vector) for 
the entire image.  Two images can be compared to see how close they are by applying the Manhattan 
Distance metric to the two associated FVs. 
2.2. Estimation of Distribution Algorithm  
The GEC used to evolve FEs in this paper is an instance of an EDA. It is used in this paper due to the 
fact that it outperformed a SSGA instance of GEFE in [25]. An EDA randomly generates an initial 
population of candidate FEs. Next, each candidate FE is assigned a fitness via a user-defined evaluation 
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function. After the initial population of candidate FEs has been assigned a fitness, the top 50% of the 
population in terms of fitness is selected and used to develop a probability density function (PDF). The 
PDF is then sampled to form an offspring population.  The offspring are then evaluated and assigned 
fitnesses. The next generation of FEs is created by replacing the worst |pop(t)|-Elites of the previous 
population with the best |pop(t)|-Elites offspring. Elites represents a user-specified parameter which 
determines the number of the best FEs from the previous population that are allowed to survive and be 
present in the subsequent population. This process of selecting the top 50% best performing FEs, allowing 
them to create a PDF, creating a set of offspring that replace the weakest individuals of the previous 
population is repeated until a user-specified termination condition has been reached. 
2.3. GEFEML
   As defined in [25], a candidate FE consists of patches with a uniform patch size, fei, is a six-tuple, 
<Xi,Yi,Wi,Hi,Mi,fi>, where Xi = {xi,0, xi,1,…, xi,n-1} represents the x-coordinates of the center pixel of the n
possible patches and Yi = {yi,0, yi,1, … , yi,n-1} represents the y-coordinates of center pixel of the n possible 
patches. The widths and heights of the n patches are represented by Wi = {wi,0, wi,1, … , wi,n-1} and Hi =
{hi,0, hi,1,…, hi,n-1}. Because the patches are uniform,   Wk = {wk,0, wk,1, … , wk,n-1} is equivalent to, wk,0 =
wk,1,…,  wk,n-2, wk,n-1 and Hk = {hk,0, hk,1, … , hk,n-1} is equivalent to, hk,0 = hk,1,…,  hk,n-2, hk,n-1, meaning 
that the widths and heights of every patch are the same.  Uniform sized patches are used because uniform 
sized patches outperformed non-uniform sized patches in [25]. Mi = {mi,0, mi,1,…, mi,n-1} represents the 
masking values for each patch and fi represents the fitness of fei . The masking value determines whether 
a patch is activated or deactivated, and by extension, whether certain pixels will be processed or not. If a 
patch is deactivated, by setting mi = 0, then the sub-histogram will not be considered in the distance 
measure, and the number of features to be used in comparisons is reduced. Otherwise, the patch is 
activated, with mi = 1. 
2.3.1 Evolving FEs 
FEs must be trained on some dataset D of subjects. Subjects have multiple images, and the images are 
divided into a probe set and a gallery set. The probe set represents the images being passed into a system, 
while the gallery set represents a database of previously enrolled images. Given a dataset D, where D is a 
training set, the fitness, fi, associated with a candidate FE, fei, is equal to the number of incorrect matches, 
ε(D), made when comparing each probe to the gallery, multiplied by 10 plus the percentage of image 
space (measured in pixels) covered by fei. The function γ(fei) calculates the percentage of space used by 
fei. Equation 1 provides an example of the evaluation function used by GEFEML to assign fitnesses to 
candidate FEs.  
                                           )()(10 ii feDf                                                                              (1) 
2.3.2. Cross Validation in GEFEML
Figure 1 provides a flowchart which describes the process used by GEFEML in evolving FEs that 
generalizes well on unseen subjects. The EDA used by GEFEML is similar to the EDA presented in 
Section 2.2 with the exception that each candidate FE is evaluated on the validation set, even though the 
candidate FE receives its fitness based on its interaction with the training set. Any candidate FE that 
outperforms FE*, the best performing FE on the validation set, replaces FE*. At the end of a run of 
GEFEML, two FEs are returned: the best performing FE on the training set, FEts, and FE*. 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the Evolutionary Process of 
GEFEML using Cross validation 
3. Mitigating Replay Attacks with Disposable FEs 
As mentioned previously, disposable FEs can be created with GEFEML. Unlike conventional BACSs
that work by enrolling a single template for each subject allowed access to a given asset, a BACS using 
disposable FEs may enroll a number of templates for a given subject (one template associated with each 
FE). When a user wants to gain access to an asset, the user will provide their biometric sample and the 
BACS will select a FE and apply it to the sample in an effort to extract a FV (template). The FV (and/or 
FE) is then passed over the network and is compared with the previous enrolled templates associated with 
the FE used to create the template.  
It is during the transmission across a network that a template can be captured and a replay attack can be 
launched. Using disposable FEs mitigates this possibility because even if the template is captured: (a) the 
hacker will not know the exact FE used to extract the appropriate template and/or (b) the captured 
template from one authentication session will not match the template expected from the user for a future 
authentication session. This is due to the fact that FEs are unique as well as the templates extracted by the 
FEs, as the results of our experiments demonstrate.
3.1 Access Control Protocol I: Comparing FEs + FVs 
Within Protocol I, both the FE and the FV must be authenticated. Protocol I works as follows. On the 
client end, a sensor captures a biometric sample (in this case, a facial image). A selected FE will extract 
features from it to create a FV. The selected FE and resulting FV will be passed to the along a network for 
comparison. On the server end, the previously enrolled FV that was created by the same FE used on the 
client end will be compared to the FV passed from the client end. In addition, the FE used on the server 
side will be compared to the FE used on the client side. For access to be granted, both FEs and FVs must 
be declared a match. After matching occurs, the system will select a new disposable FE to be used.
3.2 Access Control Protocol II: Comparing FVs only 
This protocol is implemented with the assumption that distinct FEs will produce distinct FVs. In this, it
is assumed that any FEi, which is different from FEj will produce an FVi that is also different from FVj.
Return the best fit FE on 
the training set and FE*. 
Yes
No
Evaluate the population based on the training set. Apply each candidate FE to the validation set to determine FE*.
Randomly generate a population of candidate FEs.
Stopping condition satisfied?
Select the top 50% of the population to form a PDF. 
Create offspring by sampling the PDF.
Evaluate the offspring based on the training set. Apply the offspring to the validation set and compare 
its fitness to FE*. If better, update FE*.
Form a new population by selecting 
the best performing offspring - 1.
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This protocol is similar to Protocol I, in terms of functionality, with the exception that only the FV needs 
to be transmitted across the network.  
 
4. Experiment  
In our experiments, we first evolved FEs using an instance of GEFEML [23] and performed cross-
validation during the evolutionary process to discover FEs that generalized well. From the Facial 
Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC) database, a total of 314 subjects were used to create three datasets: 
FRGC-105, consisting 105 subjects, FRGC-109, consisting of 109 subjects, and FRGC-100, which 
consists of 100 subjects. FRGC-105 was used as a training set and FRGC-109 was used as a validation set 
(see Section 2.3.2). We used FRGC-100 as a test set, to confirm that the FEs generalize to unseen 
subjects, as well as to test the uniqueness of the FEs. The datasets consisted of 3 images for each subject 
and were further divided into a probe set consisting of one image and a gallery set consisting of the other 
two images (Figure 2).  
Probe Image           Gallery Image1        Gallery Image2 
                          Figure 2. Subject Snapshots from FRGC 
  
In Experiment I, we wanted to determine the uniqueness of FEs evolved using GEFEML. To do this, we 
measure the frequencies of pixels processed between FEs. Each FE has an associated pixels matrix, with 
each position representing a pixel position on an image. The dimensions of the matrix are the same as the 
images that FEs are trained on. In the pixels matrix, the value in each position represents the number of 
times that pixel is processed by the FE. Figure 3 shows an example FE and its corresponding pixels 
matrix. For overlapping patches, the pixel is counted as being used more than once.  
We used a Normalized Manhattan Distance (NMD) metric [26] to measure the distances between two 
FEs by measuring the FEs matrices. Equation 2 shows the NMD metric for this experiment. The variables 
mi and mj represent the two matrices being measured, l represents the number of rows in a matrix, k
represents the number of columns in a matrix, y represents the current row and z represents the current 
column in the template. 
(2) 
This allowed us to determine the uniqueness of the FEs structurally. We measured the distances between 
every unique pair of FEs, and FEs in a pair were symmetric. This means that since we measure FEi and 
FEj, then we would not need to measure FEj and FEi. We recorded the number of collisions for each 
unique pair of FEs. If the NMD of a pair fell below a specified threshold, we considered that a collision. 
We plotted the percentage of pairs that have a collision at different threshold intervals. 
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Figure 3: Pixels Matrix Example
In Experiment II, we used the FEs to create FVs from just the probe dataset of FRGC-100. This resulted 
in each FE having 100 FVs associated with it. For each unique pair of FEs, we measured the distance 
between one FV of a subject from one FE, and one FV of the same subject from another FE. We 
measured the distances of all 100 subjects for each pair, using the NMD metric in Equation 3. The 
variables hi and hj represents two histograms, or templates, being measured, l represents the length of the 
template, and z represents the current position in the template. 
(3) 
We recorded the number of collisions of FVs for each unique pair of FEs. If the NMD of FVs from a 
pair of FEs fell below a decision threshold, we considered that a collision. We plotted the percentage of 
FVs that have a collision at different threshold intervals. 
Experiment III simulated the results of applying disposable FEs on a system. This experiment used the 
probe set and the gallery set from FRGC-100. As stated in Section 2.3.2, the probe set represents the users 
from the client side, while the gallery represents the enrolled templates from the server side. Each FE was 
applied to one image of the subjects in the probe set and one image of the subjects in the gallery set of 
FRGC-100, so 200 FVs were associated with each one. For every possible pair of FEs, we performed one 
to one matching between the probe FVs and the gallery FVs for all 100 subjects. We recorded the 
distances of probe subjects and gallery subjects for every non-matching FE pair and every matching FE 
pair. The distances were calculated using the NMD in Equation 3. 
5. Results 
GEFEML was run 60 times with a maximum 2000 function evaluations. We used an EDA instance of 
GEFEML that evolved a population of 20 FEs and maintained one elite. We choose 2000 evaluations 
because it yielded the best performing FE*s. We ran increments of 1000, 2000, 3000 and 4000 
evaluations to determine the best number of evaluations to perform. On each run, GEFEML returned the 
best performing FE on the training set (FEts) and the best performing FE with respect to the validation set 
(FE*).  We took the 60 best FE*s to use in our system. To confirm that the FEs generalized well to 
unseen subjects, we applied them to FRGC-100, and got an average recognition accuracy of 99.1%, based 
on the fitness function in Section 2.3.1.
5.1 Results of Experiment I: Determining the uniqueness of FEs 
For each FE, we recorded the number of times each pixel was processed within an image. FEs that 
processed the same pixels for the same number of times would be considered too close to be unique, and 
are therefore said to collide. A collision means that even though two FEs were different, the NMD 
between both were still low enough to consider the two matching. We compared all possible unique pairs 
of FEs and recorded the NMDs for each pair at different decision threshold levels. The decision threshold 
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is the value that the NMD must not exceed in order for the items being measured to be considered a 
match. If the NMD of a pair was below the threshold, then we counted that as being a collision. We 
recorded collisions using just 30 FEs, and 60 FEs, in an effort to track a decrease in uniqueness by 
introducing more FEs. Figure 4 and Figure 5 shows a plot of the percent of unique pairs that had a 
collision over an increasing threshold, labeled ‘Extractors’, for 30 FEs and 60 FEs respectively. It is 
evident that collisions do not occur until the threshold becomes relaxed, with collisions occurring at a 
threshold of 0.74.  
5.2 Results of Experiment II: Determining the uniqueness of FVs 
In Experiment II, we only used images from the probe dataset of FRGC-100. As in Experiment I, we
gather all possible unique pairs of FEs, but in this stage we measure the distance between feature vectors 
created by both FEs in a pair. If the distance fell below the decision threshold, then we considered that 
pair to have a collision. The meaning of a collision is similar to how it is described above, with the 
exception that FVs are being measured instead of FEs. We recorded the collisions of every pair of FEs, 
for all 100 images in the probe set. Figure 6 and Figure 7 shows the plot of the percent of collisions of 
feature vectors over an increasing threshold, labeled ‘vectors’, for 30 FEs as well as 60 FEs. The fact that 
collisions do not occur until the threshold exceed 0.61 suggests the same conclusion as Stage I, that FEs 
are unique enough to be distinguishable, and that unique FEs create unique FVs.
     
                                       
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
                  Figure 4: Collisions of FEs (30 FEs)                               Figure 5: Collisions of FEs (60 FEs)
                                                                                           
 
                  
Figure 6: Collisions of FVs (30 FEs)                                        Figure 7: Collisions of FVs (60 FEs) 
5.3 Results of Experiment III: Testing FVs on a dataset  
For this Experiment, we used the entire FRGC-100 dataset, probe and gallery. We used every possible 
combination of FE pairs to create FVs, and then we recorded the NMDs between the FVs of subjects from 
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the probe and gallery sets. For all matching pairs and non-matching pairs of FEs, we computed the 
average distance, the standard deviation, the minimum distances, and the maximum distances between the 
resulting FVs. The recorded distances for FVs from matching pairs and non-matching pairs are shown in 
Figure 8. The x-axis represents the NMDs and the y-axis represents the frequency that each distance 
occurred. The series ‘Matching FVs’ represents the distances obtained from the matching FVs, while the 
series ‘Non-Matching FVs’ represents the distances from the non-matching pairs of FVs. There is a large 
gap between the distances for FVs from matching FEs and non-matching FEs, which is required for a 
system where we want exclusivity. We observe the NMDs of FVs from matching FEs falls mainly within 
the 0.20 to 0.40 range. This observation supports the recognition capabilities of FEs; small distances 
mean that an evolved FE produces similar FVs for different images of the same subject. We also observe 
the NMDs of FVs for non-matching FEs falls mainly within the 0.72 to 0.96 range. This observation 
supports the exclusivity of FEs, in that large distances mean a greater difference between FEs.  
Table I shows the analysis of the NMD data from matching and non-matching FVs. The difference in 
averages shows that there is room to establish a threshold that can accurately distinguish between 
matching and non-matching FEs. This means that if a FV from a disposable FE were to be intercepted and 
used later in a replay attack, the predefined threshold is likely to reject the vector. In addition to proper 
rejection, we can use the minimum and the maximum NMD of the non-matching FEs to define a certain 
threshold range, such as 0.61 to 1.0, that issues a warning flag implying that a replay attack may have 
occurred if the NMD falls in that range. In addition, the minimum NMD of the non-matching FVs could 
be used to define a range, such as 0.0 to 0.10, that may suggest that the enrolled template may have been 
captured. 
Table 1: NMD Statistics
Figure 8: NMDs of FVs on FRGC-100                                
Statistics Non-Matching FVs
Matching 
FVs
Average 0.852217934 0.317546
Standard 
Deviation 0.057015279 0.060577
Minimum NMD 0.618097907 0.106061
Maximum NMD 1.0 0.605462
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we were able to successfully evolve FEs that created unique FVs which were exclusive 
from one another. We performed multiple experiments to test the exclusivity of FEs and their resulting 
FVs, and determined that both FEs and FVs are unique enough to mitigate replay attacks, while 
maintaining high recognition accuracy. Our experiments also suggest that we can define certain ranges 
that raise warning flags if a NMD falls within a certain range.  
Future work will be devoted towards evolving FEs with a fitness function that performs one to one 
matching, as opposed to one to many. We will also use larger datasets of individuals and experiment 
using different GECs for GEFEML. We also will consider implementing new machine learning algorithms 
in an effort to improve the generalization of our disposable FEs. 
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